https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/ Jurisprudence and Ijtihad en daily 1 Fri, 20 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0330 Fri, 20 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0330 https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/article_737046.html Human ownership of future actions, prior to the conclusion of a transaction over them, is regarded as one of the complex instances of ownership and has been discussed in various chapters such as lease (ijarah), pilgrimage (hajj), and guarantee (daman). Jurists have presented differing views concerning the “property status” (maliyya) and “ownership” (milk) of acts and their legal consequences. This issue was explicitly raised by Shaykh Ansari and subsequently pursued by later jurists. However, due to the dispersion and ambiguity of discussions concerning the ownership and property status of human acts and the interweaving of multiple issues, a precise distinction between the different aspects of the problem and their analysis is necessary.The main question of this research is whether a free person can be deemed the notional (i‘tibari) owner of his future acts before a transaction over them is concluded, and, consequently, whether effects such as the liability of a detaineror kidnapper during the period of detention can be imposed with respect to the acts of government employees (hired workers), self-employed individuals (free earners), unemployed persons (free non-earners), or the ability to perform the pilgrimage (istita‘at al-hajj) can be established merely by virtue of a person’s ownership of his acts or otherwise. Using a descriptive–analytical method and library sources, this study examines the acts of a free human being before their performance from four perspectives: property status, ownership, transferability, and the consequences arising therefrom. The findings show that such acts, in addition to having property status, possess an inherent and natural form of ownership; however, based on a sound analysis of ownership, they lack notional (i‘tibari)predicated of them, whereas the specific effects of ownership (such as establishing pilgrimage ability and liability) are negated. The contractual transfer of such acts also depends on how the essence of sale and lease contracts is interpreted. https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/article_737053.html Narrative speech, within its communicative context, consists of three essential pillars: the speaker, the communicative situation, and the addressee. Among the most significant challenges in the process of jurisprudential inference are the apparent conflicts found in narrative texts. Usul scholars have proposed solutions such as reconciliation (jam‘), preference (tarjih), choice (takhyir), and mutual cancellation (tasagut) to address this problem. Adopting a three-layered approach with particular attention to the context of issuance of narrations, the present study examines the impact of the three elements of the speaker, the communicative setting, and the addressee, along with their related aspects. Relying on hadith, jurisprudential, and usul heritage and by applying this framework to examples of seemingly conflicting narrations, the study shows that a precise understanding of the different levels at which a narration is issued can provide the ground for a more accurate comprehension of the hadith text. Taking this phenomenon into account renders a considerable number of cases of prima facie conflict in the realm of narrations solvable and, as a consequence, renders recourse to discussions of preference, choice, mutual cancellation, suspension, and caution unwarranted. Using a descriptive–analytical method and library sources, the study proposes a systematic model for resolving apparent conflicts so that the researcher may attain an “intended understanding” of the speech, an understanding grounded in contextual indicators related to the speaker, the circumstances of communication, and the addressee. https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/article_737057.html From a jurisprudential perspective, in the case of a Muslim killing a non-Muslim whose blood is inviolable (mahuquq al-damm), the punishment of retaliation (qisas) is eliminated and only blood money (diyya) is paid. However, according to the prevailing opinion of jurists, if a Muslim becomes accustomed to killing dhimmis, his punishment is death. There is, however, disagreement among jurists as to whether this punishment is based on retaliation (qisas) or on the commission of a hadd crime. The jurisprudential evidence supporting those who consider his punishment to be retaliation appears to be more cogent. The present study, using a descriptive–analytical method, concludes that despite this well-known jurisprudential view, the Islamic Penal Code of Iran remains silent on this matter and, according to another possibility, implicitly rejects this prevailing view under Article 310. This ambiguity can lead to inconsistency in judicial practice in Iran. According to Article 220 of the Islamic Penal Code, if a judge considers the killing of a dhimmi to constitute a hadd crime, he is obliged to issue a ruling based on Article 167 of the Constitution; and if the presiding judge believes that, under this article, a new crime and punishment may be established on the basis of jurisprudential opinions, he might sentence such a person to death. But if the judge regards this punishment as a form of retaliation, reliance on Article 220 becomes problematic, since that article pertains to hadd punishments. Nonetheless, regardless of this article, a ruling of retaliation may still be issued on the basis of Article 167. In view of the principle of clarity in criminal law, it is appropriate for the legislature to adopt a clear stance regarding the prevailing jurisprudential opinion. https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/article_737059.html It is evident that in the well-known duality of transactions and worship, the marriage contract does not fall under the category of acts of worship; because the intention of seeking closeness is neither an essential component nor a condition for validity. Nevertheless, it is claimed that the presence of layers of worshipfulness in the marriage contract prevents reliance on the general rules of transactional-exchange contracts concerning ambiguous rulings. In this context, references are made to evidence such as the dowry, maintenance, and right of retention as aspects of its transactional nature, as well as evidence like the invalidation of the condition of option to rescind and the non-applicability of mutual rescission, to highlight the similarity of the marriage contract to acts of worship. The question arises whether the mentioned evidence is sufficient to prove the transactional-exchange nature of the marriage contract or the existence of its similarity to the realm of worship. This research demonstrates that not only is the asserted evidence regarding the similarity of the marriage contract to acts of worship incorrect and does not pose a barrier to invoking the general rules, but through examination and analysis of juristic sources, the hypothesis is established that the marriage contract possesses a unique and special nature, and fundamentally, there is no room for invoking the general rules of transactional-exchange contracts; hence, in its rulings, one must solely heed the indications of the legislator, and until a statement from legislator is established, one should refrain and observe caution in rulings. https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/article_737062.html This study examines the attribution of a suspect’s death to law enforcement officers in light of the narrations on night-time summons from the perspective of Imami jurisprudence. The importance of this issue lies in determining the extent of the responsibility of law enforcement officials for potential harm to suspects, particularly in cases leading to death. Using a descriptive–analytical method and library research, the study proceeds in three stages: assessing the authenticity of the narrations, examining the scope of their indication, and determining their applicability to law enforcement officers. The findings show that at least one of the two narrations discussed in this regard is authentic. An examination of the scope of these narrations indicates that the night-time nature of the summons is a necessary condition for establishing the inviter’s liability. Furthermore, Article 513 of the 2013 Islamic Penal Code, by adding the phrase “under suspicious circumstances,” lacks sufficient precision, whereas Article 338 of the 1996 Islamic Penal Code is more consistent with the purport of the narrations. Finally, an analysis of the applicability of these narrations to law enforcement officers shows that potential obstacles—such as the legal obligation of the officer or the necessity of the offender’s presence before the judicial authority—do not preclude the narrations’ applicability. However, in cases where the officer acts in full compliance with his legal duties, his obligation to pay blood money may be waived, though the attribution of death to him nonetheless remains. https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/article_737063.html Organ removal and transplantation, as a common medical practice in many countries, has always faced numerous jurisprudential challenges. One of the fundamental issues is whether it is permissible to transfer an organ from a Muslim to a non-Muslim and vice versa. Opponents of this practice invoke arguments such as the principle of non-domination of unbelievers over Muslims, the prohibition of violating the bodily inviolability of Muslims, and the prohibition of mutilation. On the other hand, organ transplantation from a non-Muslim to a Muslim is also confronted with obstacles such as the prohibition of mutilation and an apparent conflict with narrations that emphasize respect for a dhimmi unbeliever. The lack of theoretical coherence and independent research in this field underscores the necessity of a renewed and comprehensive jurisprudential examination of this issue. Employing a descriptive–analytical method, this study explores the various jurisprudential impediments to the permissibility of organ transplantation from a Muslim to a non-Muslim and vice versa. The findings indicate that, with due observance of specific conditions and the individual’s prior consent, and in light of the overarching interest of preserving human life, organ transplantation can be justified from a jurisprudential perspective. Accordingly, in cases where saving the life of a non‑harbi unbeliever or preserving one of his organs depends on transplantation, performing such an operation is permissible, provided that prior consent has been given by the Muslim or by his legal guardians. https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/article_737113.html According to jurisprudential fatwas and Article (419) of the Islamic Penal Code, in cases of intentional homicide, the implementation of qisas and direct involvement in it is the right of the victim’s heirs. However, in some instances of perpetrating a crime, doubts arise regarding the establishment of this right. One such case is when an heir coerces someone to murder their ancestor, and the coerced individual commits the murder. The source of ambiguity in establishing the right of qisas for the heir is that they themselves compelled the perpetrator to kill their ancestor and, in essence, provided the cause for the committed murder. Furthermore, the coercion implying the heir’s strong consent to the commission of the murder can be another reason for the forfeiture of their right to qisas. Nevertheless, the generality of the proofs for establishing the right of qisas for the heirs, as well as the non-impact of their consent on the forfeiture of this right, are among the reasons that strengthen the qisas of the coerced individual. In this paper, by gathering sources and data through a library-based approach, and with a descriptive-analytical perspective, the conclusion has been reached that the heir (mukrih - coercer) cannot, in the capacity of the holder of the right of qisas, exact qisas from the coerced individual in return for the murder of the ancestor, because their act of coercion forfeits the right of qisas. https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/article_737114.html The jurist-prophet (Shari’) expresses rulings in various ways, and the use of tanzil is one method employed in narrations and common address to achieve this purpose. A precise understanding of the nature of tanzil and the extent of its implication directly influences the inference of rulings and the understanding of narrations that employ the language of tanzil. The scholars’ perspective on tanzil in the discussions of zuhurat (manifestations) and ta’adul wa tarajiḥ (balance and preference) has been a tangential issue, and important aspects of the discussion around it, such as the distinction between tanzil and similar terminologies, different types of tanzil, the degree of its implication, and the mutual influence of the munazzal (descended) and munazzal 'alayhi (descended upon), as well as the establishment or non-establishment of the implications of tanzil, each requiring precise inferential discussion in the sources of manifestation, underscore the significance of investigating tanzil. However, this topic has not been independently addressed in the scholarly works of jurists. Therefore, the present paper, employing a descriptive and analytical method, clarifies and scrutinizes the less-discussed aspects of this issue. The conclusion reached is that tanzil is independent of i’tibar (consideration) and ḥukumat (governance). In the absence of a contraindicating evidence (qarīnah), tanzil ultimately means transferring the rulings of the munazzal 'alayhi to the munazzal, and the apparent implications of the munazzal 'alayhi will be established for the munazzal. https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/article_737115.html Late-payment penalties in the banking system of the Islamic Republic of Iran have created a fundamental tension between economic necessities and religious requirements. The main question of this study is the apparent conflict between economic necessities and Shari‘a obligations regarding late-payment penalties. On the one hand, such penalties seem necessary for maintaining economic order and preventing abuse by debtors; on the other hand, some jurists consider them a form of usury (riba) and incompatible with Islamic principles. This tension has placed the country’s banking system at a crossroads between preserving economic efficiency and adhering to religious principles. Seeking to provide a solution to this problem, the present study introduces an innovative, integrative approach. Its novelty lies in creatively combining jurisprudential principles such as the no-harm rule (qa‘idat la darar) and causation (tasbib) with legal concepts such as stipulations within contracts. This integrative approach offers a practical mechanism to address the economic difficulties resulting from delayed repayment of banking facilities while simultaneously observing Shari‘a principles. Using a descriptive–analytical method and a careful examination of library sources and legal documents, the research reaches several important findings, including the possibility of revising the structure of banking contracts to incorporate more precise and Shari‘a-compliant stipulations, providing a religiously legitimate solution for compensating losses arising from delayed repayment without conflicting with Islamic principles, and proposing specific legal and regulatory reforms to resolve the tension between economic needs and religious obligations. These findings demonstrate that, through a creative and flexible approach, a balance can be achieved between economic efficiency and adherence to Shari‘a in the Islamic banking system. https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/article_737120.html Verse 9 of Sūrat al-Jumu‘ah calls Muslims to the establishment of the Friday Prayer and, within this command, prohibits trade at the time of its performance. Accordingly, the legal ruling of conducting a sale during the Friday Prayer must be clarified from the standpoint of various Islamic legal schools. Jurists of the Imāmī school and the four Sunni schools have presented diverse opinions on this matter. Using a descriptive‑analytical method and drawing upon library sources, this article first examines the nature of the prohibition—whether it is indicative of dislike (tanzīh) or strict prohibition (tahrīm). It then analyzes the scope of the addressees of the prohibition and, consequently, the ruling of buying and selling for those addressed. The study concludes that differences regarding both the nature of the prohibition and the identity of the addressees significantly influence the divergent rulings among scholars on the permissibility or impermissibility of sale during the Friday Prayer. Based on the three proofs of the form of the prohibition, exegetical narrations, and the prevailing understanding of early Muslim communities at the time of revelation—and in light of available evidence—the article finds that the prohibition in the verse is of a *tahrīmī* nature, meaning that trade must be abandoned during the Friday Prayer. The addressees of this prohibition are legally responsible men, while women and children are not included among those obligated by the command. https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/article_737126.html This article examines the binding (luzūm) and non-binding (jawāz) nature of Shar‘i contracts based on two theoretical foundations: the doctrines of *intizā‘iyyah* (derivational abstraction of legal rulings) and *istiqlāliyyah* (independence of legal effects). It then analyzes the implications of these foundations for interpreting Article 219 of the Iranian Civil Code. The principal innovation of the study lies in offering a novel explanation that, contrary to the prevailing view attributed to Shaykh Ansari regarding the absolute binding force of contracts, demonstrates—drawing on the opinion of ‘Allāmah Ḥillī—the permissibility of certain contracts such as agreements of contest (musābaqa). The study further shows that binding force applies exclusively to *conclusive* (tanjīzī) contracts. Based on the doctrine of abstraction of legal (was‘ī) rulings from prescriptive (taklīfī) rulings, the findings illuminate the fundamental differences between actual ownership and suspensive ownership, proving that suspensive binding force cannot be independently derived. Moreover, the independence doctrine on its own is likewise insufficient to infer the binding force of suspensive contracts. Employing critical analysis of fiqh and legal sources along with logical induction, the study critiques three key theories and proposes a reasoned framework for a more accurate understanding of the principle of binding force (*asl aliluzūm*) in Shar‘i contracts. The conclusions point toward a restricted interpretation of Article 219 of the Iranian Civil Code, excluding suspensive contracts from its scope and confining the article to conclusive contracts. This novel approach can significantly contribute to enhancing fiqh-legal understanding of contracts and improving the application of the Civil Code of Iran. https://mags.markazfeqhi.com/article_737127.html Insirāf (abstraction/withdrawal of meaning) is among the factors that prevent the formation of generality (itlāq) in jurisprudential texts and has extensive applications in various issues. It is rare to find a jurisprudential matter where the discussion of generality arises without a reference to inṣirāf or its possibility. The time gap between the issuance of narrations and current conditions, on the one hand, and thematic changes and innovations, on the other, has led to increased attention to the discussion of insirāf and its possibility in jurisprudence and usul. The fundamental question is: does the possibility of insirāf remove generality in the same way as definite insirāf? Considering the impact of this discussion on inference and the lack of adequate research, the authors, in this research, have investigated this subject in an analytical-critical manner using library-based sources. This research indicates that some prominent scholars consider the possibility of inṣirāf to be a barrier to the realization of generality, similar to definite insirāf. This view has led to differing opinions regarding the impact of the possibility of insirāf on the manifestation of generality. Some usul scholars believe that in the absence of definitive evidence (qarīnah qas’iyyah), the principle of generality (asl al-itlāq) can prevent the possibility of insirāf from having an effect. This theory is based on asālat al-itlāq (the principle of generality) and renders the possibility of inṣirāf ineffective. Another viewpoint, based on a principle of usul, considers doubt and uncertainty to be barriers to the manifestation of speech and deems the possibility of inṣirāf as disruptive to generality. This research, with an analytical-critical approach and using library-based sources, examines this subject and shows that the second theory, namely the impact of the possibility of insirāf in preventing the manifestation of generality, is more robust.